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Freeman’s two discussants, John and Jim, are engaged in a disagreement about the
permissibility or impermissibility of certain sexual acts. John has taken the “anything
goes” position—“What people do between the sheets is their own business.” Jim is
attacking John’s position, and Freeman’s examples show the nature of this attack: Jim
should present what Freeman calls “interpretive properties” capable of expression in a
Toulmin warrant form that support the impermissibility of certain sexual acts. Freeman’s
two examples of such properties are: (1) performing sex completely divorced from
procreation; and (2) performing sex in which one, or both, of the sexual partners feels
degraded. Freeman now allows John only two forms of rebuttal. John could first ask Jim
to justify the warrants. Second, John could grant the prima facie acceptability of the
impermissibility warrants, but claim that there is some further “deontically relevant
property” (Freeman, p. 3) that overturns Jim’s warrants. Freeman notes that John takes on
a “very significant burden of proof” in making this rebuttal. Jim’s answer to John can
avoid taking on a similar burden of proof provided that Jim “can construct a scenario into
which both he and John can enter empathetically” (Freeman, p. 3) and for which there is
some relevant property Xi which both Jim and John agree outweighs any other
permissibility-relevant property.
Freeman describes the moral dissensus between John and Jim as a matter of
divergence “over the properties which they see as relevant to evaluations….” (p. 3) He
lays out a formula to clarify symbolically how the dissensus goes: roughly, two persons
may differ with respect to an action’s right-making properties and wrong-making
properties as well as with respect to which set of properties outweighs the other.
Consistently, Freeman expresses a strong endorsement and acceptance of W. D. Ross’s
theory of ethical intuitionism. Following Ross, Freeman views dissensus as a matter of
differing perceptions of an act’s weighted properties, and resolution of dissensus as a
matter of reconciliation of the contrasting property perceptions. In sum, moral judgment
is fundamentally a matter of property perception.
My initial concern is that Freeman’s analysis, with its strong emphasis on the
properties of actions, does not do justice to quite ordinary cases of moral dissensus.
Moreover, his reconstruction of Toulmin warrants does not permit at least one important
type of warrant Toulmin himself might acknowledge. To see this, consider an elaboration
of Freeman’s John and Jim dialogue. According to Freeman, Jim should construct a
variety of scenarios in which relevant properties tend to show (prima facie) the
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impermissibility of a certain sexual act. Suppose, in addition to Freeman’s two examples,
Jim also advances the possibility that the act may involve verbal insults and severe
psychological abuse, or that the act may involve physical harm and injury to one of the
partners. That is, suppose Jim, following Freeman, puts forward a number of properties
that give a prima facie warrant for the impermissibility of the act. Freeman, as noted
above, allows John only two responses: challenge Jim’s warrants for the Toulmin
principles advanced or propose some other relevant property of the act that is overriding.
John, however, could respond in a manner quite outside these two forms of rebuttal. John
might say, “Look, I agree with you that if the action involves these things—degradation,
insults, abuse, or physical injury—then it is wrong and should not be permitted. However,
what does that have to do with it being a sexual act? If I were playing golf and my golf
partner began insulting my putting ability, verbally abusing my swing, and even hitting
me with his clubs, then that would be wrong, too, but not because it is an immoral golfing
action!” Note well that John agrees with Jim’s assessment of the various actions—both
judge them impermissible. Nor does John disagree with Jim on any of the relevant
deontic properties, either in terms of what they are, whether they are relevant, or what the
balance of wrongness over rightness is. Nevertheless, John believes that his standpoint on
sexuality has not been addressed, and the main disagreement still holds.
In this elaboration, John might well be appealing tacitly to general principles—a
common move in cases of moral dissensus. John might be thinking of something like
John Stuart Mill’s ‘harm principle’ as a ‘liberty limiting principle’—that is, the only
justification for making actions impermissible is when those actions harm or threaten
harm to others. H. L. A. Hart accepts Mill’s harm principle, but is willing to include a
legal paternalism principle wherein sanctions may also be imposed on actions which
harm or threaten to harm the agent himself or herself. Joel Feinberg not only accepts
Mill’s harm principle, but also wishes to endorse an offense principle in which sanctions
may be imposed on actions that cause, or threaten to cause, profound offense to others.
(See Richard Galvin’s paper “Legal Moralism and the U. S. Supreme Court,” presented at
the 2006 Eastern American Philosophical Association AILACT group session and
currently available on the AILACT website.) For these philosophers, the main moral
concern is to maximize individual liberty, and actions are to be judged permissible as
long as they do not violate the harm, or other, principles. In contrast to Freeman’s
account, John’s response to Jim need not point to other moral properties of the action, or
assign greater weight than Jim does to the possession of some property or other. Rather,
John may be making a tacit appeal to a higher moral principle along the lines of Mill’s
harm principle. John may be taking the stance that it is not the sexual features or
properties of the action that matter, it is only the question of whether or not harm is
involved that matters. Lacking such harm to others (or harm to oneself in Hart’s case, or
causing profound offense to others in Feinberg’s case), there is no justification for
limiting individual sexual liberties. It strikes me that Toulmin would view John’s appeal
to such a principle as a paradigm example of appealing to a warrant; nevertheless, I don’t
see how Freeman can include it within his analysis. Toulmin may have argued against
moral absolutism and the purely deductive nature of moral reasoning associated with it,
but that does not mean Toulmin eschewed any appeal to general moral principles.
Likewise, Toulmin may have valued a return to casuistry in order to discern the relevant
moral features of an action, but doing so does not imply that Toulmin excluded the use of

2

COMMENTARY ON JAMES B. FREEMAN
principles in moral reasoning. It is hard to see how Freeman could accommodate these
aspects of Toulmin’s thought.
The recognition of the importance of both principles and facts in moral
deliberation is found in John Rawls’ notion of ‘reflective equilibrium,’ in which both
general moral principles and accepted moral facts may play a role in moral decisionmaking. Rawls argues that moral facts we accept may lead us to revise our moral
principles; likewise, moral principles we hold dear may cause us to reject various moral
facts. The “reflective equilibrium” we sustain is holistic: coherence after due reflection on
various considerations, including general principles and moral facts, is sovereign. Thus,
my present concern with Freeman’s analysis is how he can make sense of what seems to
be a brute fact, for Rawls at least, about moral deliberations, including cases of dissensus:
the common appeal to both moral facts and general moral principles.
Perhaps this is unfair to Freeman. He does describe the Toulmin warrants
expressing interpretive properties as “principles,” capable of expression as “universally
generalized subjunctive conditional statements.” Are these principles enough to counter
my worries about his analysis not permitting the introduction of moral principles? I
submit that they are not. Freeman’s warrants or principles are obtained by a routine
translation process based on specific wrong-making properties. The “universal
principles” thus obtained will all have the form: “If an action has property Xi, then it is
impermissible.” Moreover, the properties Xi are all ‘deontically relevant properties,’ but
are not moral properties per se. Freeman could argue that this captures Mill’s harm
principle, which could be cast in what looks like the same form: “If an action causes harm
to others, then it is impermissible.” But that misses the point of Mill’s view: harm is the
only liberty limiting principle, and is justified as the only one by further appeal to the
principle of utility. Both principles occur within a systematic moral theory and are quite
different in scope and theoretic depth from Freeman’s property-based principles.
Similarly, Kant’s categorical imperative, in contrast to Freeman’s model, does not target
specific moral properties or features of an action at all; thus, it is hard to see how
Freeman could allow an appeal to anything like the categorical imperative in his analysis.
Nor does anything Freeman develops later in his paper permit the introduction of the sort
of general moral principle John Rawls countenances in moral deliberations. Freeman
introduces Rescher’s complex schemata for expressing assertions and counterassertions
with presumptive force. His analysis, however, still focuses on the possession of rightmaking and wrong-making properties and the claimed balance between them. Later,
Freeman introduces complex schemata of his own, inspired by Govier’s diagramming
techniques, but Freeman’s emphasis remains on the properties or features of the action or
situation upon which the moral properties supervene. In fact, throughout his paper,
Freeman is quite consistent. In his later discussions of acquired perceptions and their
relation to interpretive principles and different types of warrant backing, Freeman
maintains the centrality of his model of moral dissensus:
Why might proponent and challenger not reach consensus? Given their arguments, they still could
disagree over the acceptability of a premise or the reliability of a warrant, given its backing and
potential rebuttals. But even more fundamentally, they may continue to disagree over whether the
features positively relevant to the evaluative property ascribed outweigh the negative features, or
whether the negative features outweigh the positive. (Freeman, p. 17)
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Freeman’s giving dominance to property or feature perception, to the exclusion of any
consideration of general principles, worries me most, for it raises doubts about the
general applicability of Freeman’s analysis to instances of moral deliberation and
dissensus.
I have a further concern about Freeman’s use of supervenience. What John’s golf
counterexample also shows is that specifying what the “relevant” right-making or wrongmaking characteristics of an action are cannot be a simple matter: no simple laundry list
of all the features of an action will do. That an action may be sexual in part may have no
bearing on what the act’s properties are upon which the evaluative properties supervene.
Only some of the features of any action may be the ones supporting the supervenience
relation, with many of the action’s properties being irrelevant or coincidental. However,
that creates the major problem of deciding which are relevant. Appealing to
supervenience is a popular move in a number of philosophical contexts, but placed under
scrutiny, it may not have the explanatory power so often touted. In the present instance, it
is not clear whether Freeman is using supervenience to indicate some kind of
metaphysical necessity, logical necessity, or merely nomological necessity between the
deontically-relevant characteristics and the overall rightness and wrongness of the action.
Also, is Freeman expressing ontological commitments with respect to the existence of
rightness and wrongness as metaphysically independent properties? In any case, John’s
response calls in question exactly which properties truly supervene on which. Is the
action best described as a sexual action simpliciter or is it a degrading, insulting, abusive,
or injurious action that is also, coincidentally, a sexual action or a golf-playing action? So,
adding the notion of supervenience to Ross’s moral-properties-in-balance analysis may
be an unnecessary and unhelpful complication.
One last worry is how analogical moral reasoning might fit with Freeman’s model,
but perhaps that is best left for later discussion.
W. D. Ross has given moral philosophers the valuable notion of a prima facie
duty, especially important when considering cases of moral conflict or dissensus.
Freeman deserves much credit for having developed that notion further, tying it to the
idea of a Toulmin warrant--even extending it to Rescher’s presumption schemata. In
addition, Freeman provides us with an innovative argument-diagramming procedure able
to clarify the nature of the moral dissensus at hand, perhaps even aiding in the resolution
of a disagreement. Also, Freeman’s discussion of acquired perceptual beliefs and how
they are given presumptive status, especially in cases of cross-cultural dissensus, is
intriguing. In short, there is much of value in Freeman’s paper. My main concern is that,
in embracing Ross’s ethical theory so firmly in all its points, especially in its
supervenience property-based model, Freeman has prevented these important ideas from
having the free play they deserve in clarifying the nature of moral reasoning and moral
dissensus.
link to response

link to paper
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